

A Hidden Agenda of Recovery: The Psychiatric Conceptualization of Re-education for Germany in the United States during World War II

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In January 1946, the Harvard sociologist Edward Y. Hartshorne, who as a military government university officer for Greater Hesse oversaw the re-opening of most universities in the American zone of occupation in 1945–1946, praised the book written in 1945 by the exile Werner Richter, who had stressed Germany's liberal and democratic potential, rather than the obsolescence of its authoritarianism. Hartshorne found it a refreshing antidote to the simplistic assumption that re-education equalled education reform, and that the latter meant indoctrination in the name of democracy. 'The problem confronting us in "re-educating Germany" could scarcely be better summed up than in the single formulation (p. 133): "One cannot simultaneously enslave and educate for freedom".'¹

That education for freedom extended beyond the purely educational realm Hartshorne knew only too well. He had published on the socio-psychological mechanisms behind Nazi propaganda and the idealization of Hitler,² and joined the Psychological Warfare Division (PWD) in 1943: he had also been a close associate of the Harvard sociologist, Talcott Parsons, who had

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¹ Edward Y. Hartshorne Jr., 'Richter's Re-Educating Germany', *Harvard Educational Review*, 16 (1946), 73, referring to Werner Richter, *Re-Educating Germany* (Chicago, 1945). The quotation from Richter was also used in: Hartshorne, 'Reopening German Universities', *M G Weekly Information Bulletin*, 27 May 1946, p. 9. Hartshorne's own judgement on the problems and prospects of democratization of German universities in late 1945 was contained in an article published under the name of his father-in-law, the historian Sidney B. Fay, 'Our Responsibility for German Universities', *Forum*, 105 (January 1946), 396–402; for some of the background, see *The Secret Diaries and Correspondence of Edward Y. Hartshorne*, edited by James F. Tent (unpublished).

² Edward Y. Hartshorne, *German Youth and the Nazi Dream of Victory* (New York, 1941); 'Reaction to the Nazi Threat: A Study of Propaganda and Culture Conflict', *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 3 (1941), 625–639; see also his 'Memorandum on Propaganda and National Morale' (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard College Library, 1941), unpublished. Hartshorne was also the probable author of the Office of Strategic Services R & A Branch Paper No. 609 (originally, COI Report No. 21), entitled 'Current German Attitudes and the German War Effort', 19 March 1942 (unpublished, Harvard College Library), as well as OSS R & A Branch Paper No. 634 (originally, COI Report No. 40), entitled 'Procedures for Developing Morale in the German Armed Forces', 11 May 1942 (unpublished, Harvard College Library).

published work on propaganda and social control.³ In 1944, Parsons was one of two sociologists invited to a primarily medical conference organized by the Columbia University neurologist, Richard Brickner, on the topic of 'Germany After the War'. Under the sponsorship of the War Department, this conference undertook to base the re-education of Germany on psychiatric concepts.⁴ Hartshorne helped to distribute the conference report both to various social scientists working for the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) and to high-ranking military personnel in Britain and the US who were devising an occupation policy for Germany.

By 1945/6, he was thus well aware that re-education for Germany meant more than a re-organization of education. He knew that a wealth of psychological, anthropological, and psychiatric ideas had been discussed since the early 1940s which were concerned with issues such as national character and cultural tradition. Their main thrust was that Germans' capacity to act on their own judgement had to be strengthened by carefully devised policies of change which re-introduced a regard for truth and fact and (re-)established a sense of 'fair play'.

In his memoirs, which he wrote immediately after returning home after over four years as Deputy Military Governor and then Military Governor of Germany, Lucius D. Clay dealt with the more-than-educational ethos of re-education under the heading 'The Way to Democracy: The Appeal to the German Mind'.⁵ Clay subsumed under this heading the diverse fields of radio and theatre, the press and public opinion polls, labour leadership and trade unions, schools and universities, and the churches. 'We had to penetrate the German consciousness to deliver our message', he reported, adding 'only the truth constantly repeated could overcome the cynicism of a Goebbels audience'.⁶

Few realize that psychology and psychiatry were involved both in analysing the German mentality and in elaborating the principle of re-education as a

³ Talcott Parsons, 'Propaganda and Social Control', *Psychiatry*, 5 (1942), 551–572, reprinted in *Talcott Parsons on National Socialism*, edited and with an introduction by Uta Gerhardt (New York, 1993), pp. 243–274. Parsons' main works on National Socialism were mostly articles. Among these were 'Max Weber and the Contemporary Political Crisis' (1942), 'Some Sociological Aspects of Fascist Movements' (1942), 'Racial and Religious Differences in Group Tensions' (1945), and 'The Problem of Controlled Institutional Change' (1945) which dealt with Germany's postwar transformation. Parsons planned a book with Hartshorne in the second half of 1941, entitled *German Social Structure and National Psychology*, to be published with Reynal and Hitchcock. The plan was abandoned partly because Hartshorne joined the Office of the Coordinator of Information (COI) in September, 1941, and came under the rule that intelligence work did not allow independent scholarly publications, and partly because America's entry into WWII set other priorities. Harvard University Archives, Parsons Papers, HUG(FP)-15.2, box 16. See Uta Gerhardt, 'Talcott Parsons' Sociology of National Socialism', in *Parsons on National Socialism*, p. 27.

⁴ For a detailed discussion, see below, part 3 of this paper.

⁵ Lucius D. Clay, *Decision in Germany* (Garden City, 1950), pp. 281–305.

⁶ Clay, *Decision*, 281; regarding the 'strategy of truth' as an official and deliberately democracy-oriented principle of work in the Office of War Information (OWI), see Carl J. Friedrich,

policy of cultural and political democratization. Although never stated as a clearcut guideline for policy, this perspective underlay a broad range of programmes and measures. Any understanding of re-education which focuses only on the educational realm is far too narrow. We need to take notice of and appreciate the contributions made by psychiatry in collaboration with the social sciences, particularly psychology, anthropology, and sociology.

The underlying aim of changing the Germans was recognized by contemporary critics who declared re-education a failure. For instance, Franz L. Neumann, émigré analyst for OSS and author of one of the most comprehensive contemporary treatises on Nazi Germany, deplored the introduction of bourgeois values to Germans lest these inadvertently undermine their denazification: he felt that the spirit of socialism would be much more suitable to help them to build a non-fascist Germany.⁷ Another critic was Saul Padover, an Austrian-American who was one of the Psychological Warfare Division's vanguard for German transformation in 1945. He felt that authoritarianism and fatalism were too deeply ingrained in the German mentality to be removed by mere re-education. 'The problem of re-education, in brief, is not merely one of eradicating nazism', he wrote, 'but also of eliminating authoritarianism, militarism, Junkerism, and racism. The evil work of Hitler, be it remembered, lasted only a dozen years, but that of his predecessors went on for generations. The occupying powers are now called upon to wipe out in a comparatively short period of time this age-old accumulation of dangerous notions.'⁸

Such a view was not Padover's alone. It had been introduced by Vice-President Henry A. Wallace in a radio speech broadcast on 29 December 1942 on 'Post-War Policy at Home and Abroad'. Beside full employment as a post-war policy goal at home, Wallace outlined the following scenario for US policy abroad: 'We must de-educate and re-educate (the German and Japanese) peoples for Democracy . . . The one hope for Europe remains as

⁷ 'Principles of Informational Strategy', *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 7 (1943), 77–89; Jerome S. Bruner, 'OWI and the American Public', *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 7 (1943), 125–138; Allen M. Winkler, *The Politics of Propaganda. The Office of War Information 1942–1945* (New Haven and London, 1978).

⁸ Franz L. Neumann, 'Die Umerziehung der Deutschen', *Das sozialistische Jahrhundert*, 2 (1946/7), 292–308, 329–345, 'Re-educating the Germans', *Commentary*, 3 (1947), 517–525, 'Military Government and the Revival of Democracy in Germany', *Journal of International Affairs*, 2 (1948), 3–31; Office of Intelligence Research Reports 1947–1948 (Nos 4237 and 4626), in Alfons Söllner (ed.), *Zur Archäologie der Demokratie in Deutschland*, vol. 2: *Analysen von politischen Emigranten im amerikanischen Außenministerium 1946–1949* (Frankfurt, 1976). Part III: 'Die restaurative Überformung der Demokratisierung—Umerziehung und Entnazifizierung', pp. 177–249.

⁹ Saul Padover, 'The Failure of the Re-education of Germany' (1947), in Julia E. Johnsen (ed.), *The Dilemma of Postwar Germany* (New York, 1948), p. 181; Padover, Lieutenant Colonel, a member of the Psychological Warfare Division, was one of the first non-combatant Allied troops to enter defeated Germany, eliminating blatantly Nazi personnel and, among other things, trying to find and inaugurate non-Nazi *Bürgermeister*, putting them in charge of abandoned or collapsed local government. See his *Experiment in Germany* (New York, 1946), and a surprisingly unenthusiastic review by Helen Arthur Hewitt in *Psychiatry*, 9 (1946), 278–279.

a change of mentality on the part of the German. He must be taught to give up the century-old conception that his is the master race. The German people must learn to un-learn all that they have been taught, not only by Hitler, but by his predecessors in the last hundred years, by so many of their philosophers and teachers, the disciples of blood and iron. The United Nations must back up military disarmament with psychological disarmament.⁹ Although Wallace went on to make clear that this would mean at least supervision and maybe direct control of the educational system in Germany (and Japan),¹⁰ his audience understood that the aim was to interfere with the very basis of German (and Japanese) *Weltanschauung*. Such 'peace planning' was a widely discussed topic in the social sciences throughout 1943 and until the end of the war, attempting to anticipate and to prepare for the expected peace in the US and its erstwhile enemy countries through psychological and psychiatric research and analysis.¹¹ To this end, education was closely related to the problems addressed by psychology and psychiatry.¹²

⁹ Quoted by O. H. Mowrer, 'Educational Considerations in Making and Keeping the Peace', *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 38 (1943), 174–175. That education in the American context extends beyond schools and embraces politics may be seen from President Franklin D. Roosevelt's use of the term. In his famous address to the Commonwealth Club in San Francisco in 1932, he said that the art of government included 'formulating a policy and using the political techniques to attain so much of that policy as will receive general support: persuading, leading, sacrificing, teaching always, because the greatest duty of a statesman is to educate.' Quoted by Richard W. Steele, 'Preparing the Public for War: Efforts to Establish a National Propaganda Agency, 1940–1941', *American Historical Review*, 75 (1970), 1640.

¹⁰ My argument is concerned with Germany only. It does not intend to make any comparisons between Japan and Germany as do, for instance, John D. Montgomery, *Forced To Be Free* (Chicago, 1957), or Beate Rosenzweig, 'Die Umerziehung zweier besiegter Nationen: Die Reeducationspolitik der Amerikaner in Deutschland und Japan—ein Vergleich', *Bildung und Erziehung*, 43 (1990), 449–458. With regard to Germany, however, I do not share the view that the victorious Americans indoctrinated a basically unwilling or recalcitrant German population with 'enforced' denazification and democratization. The latter view is also taken in an unpublished manuscript using interview material from the Studies in German-American Postwar Problems, directed by Kurt H. Wolff, 'German Attempts at Picturing Germany' (Columbus, Ohio State University Department of Sociology and Anthropology, 1955).

¹¹ Ross Stagner, 'Peace Planning as a Problem of the Psychology of Learning', *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 38 (1943), 183–192; Eugene Lerner, 'Preface to the Psychology of Peace and Reconstruction', *The Journal of Psychology*, 15 (1943), 3–25; Nevitt Sanford, 'American Conscience and the Coming Peace', *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 38 (1943), 158–165; Ross Stagner, 'Public Opinion and Peace Plans', *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 7 (1943), 297–306; see furthermore O. H. Mowrer, 'Motivation and Learning in Relation to the National Emergency', *Psychological Bulletin*, 28 (1941), 174–182; A. H. Maslow, 'The Dynamics of Psychological Security-Insecurity', *Character and Personality*, 10 (1941/42), 331–344; H. M. Kaller, 'The War and Education in the United States', *American Journal of Sociology* 48 (1942), 331–334; C. A. Dykstra, 'Education and World Conflict', *Psychological Review*, 19 (1942), 298–318; Vera Michaelis Dean, 'Germany's Role in Postwar Reconstruction', *Yale Review*, 32 (1942), 437–443; John Perry, 'War Propaganda for Democracy', *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 6 (1942), 437–443; and furthermore Ross Stagner, 'Opinions of Psychologists on Peace Planning', *Journal of Psychology*, 19 (1945), 3–16; Gardner Murphy (ed.), *Human Nature and Enduring Peace* (Boston, 1945); Everett Case, 'Education for a Lasting World Peace', in John Krout (ed.), *Proceedings of the American Academy of Political Science* (1944–1946) (New York, 1946), pp. 357–364.

¹² Robert Ulrich, 'The Problem of German Reeducation', *Social Research*, 11 (1944), 152–167; Pitirim Sorokin, 'The Conditions and Prospects for a World without War', *American Journal of*

When the topic of re-education was taken up by historians in Germany and the US in the 1970s and 1980s, the main focus was its impact on schools and universities. Regrettably, German scholars added to this narrowing of the field by giving a somewhat biased negative perspective. Germans often use the derogatory term devised by the Goebbels Ministry for Popular Enlightenment and Propaganda—‘Umerziehung’—to characterize the programme. According to this limited view, the Americans’ attempts at indoctrination in the name of democracy were by and large unsuccessful, any positive spin-off being inadvertent. Some critics even charge that anti-German prejudices were so prevalent in 1944–1945 that Henry Morgenthau’s de-industrialization plan, part of the re-education policy, was in fact devised as a punitive measure.¹³

This picture was favourably revised by James F. Tent’s detailed history of the relationship between re-education and denazification, but he dismissed

Sociology, 49 (1944), 441–449; Lawrence K. Frank, ‘The Historian as Therapist’, *Psychiatry*, 7 (1944), 231–236. Ruth Stange distinguished between two types of aggressiveness, one is ‘easily provoked and is a general way of responding to many situations’, and the other is ‘necessary in self-defense’, ‘not easily provoked’ and, if aroused, is not accompanied by guilt feelings which are exacerbated by a general lack of feeling of adequacy of self. See Ruth Stange, ‘Education Against Aggression’, *Harvard Educational Review*, 16 (1946), 273–281, esp. 278–280. An insert printed with the article reports that the State Department had copies of it sent to Germany, Austria, Japan and Korea for translation and republication under licence of the US Military Government. Based on the public opinion polls taken in connection with the so-called Strategic Bombing Survey (June 1945), see also Helen Peak, ‘Some Psychological Problems in the Re-education of Germany’, *Journal of Social Issues*, 2 (1946), 26–38. See also Louise E. Hoffman, ‘American Psychologists and Wartime Research on Germany, 1941–1945’, *American Psychologist*, 47 (1992), 264–273.

¹³ Karl-Ernst Bungenstab, *Umerziehung zur Demokratie? Re-education-Politik im Bildungswesen der US-Zone 1945–1949* (Düsseldorf, 1970); Otto Schlander, *Re-education—ein politisch-pädagogisches Prinzip im Widerstreit der Gruppen* (Frankfurt, 1975); Manfred Heinemann (ed.), *Umerziehung und Wiederaufbau* (Stuttgart, 1981), a book with a cavalier approach to details—one contribution even attributes the often-cited Morgenthau plan to Hans (sic) Morgenthau; Rebecca Boehling, ‘Das antideutsche Vorurteil in den USA und seine Wirkung auf die Nachkriegspolitik in der US-Zone 1943–1947’, *Bildung und Erziehung*, 34 (1981), 132–149; Karl-Heinz Füssl, ‘Die amerikanische Umerziehungs- und Neuorientierungspolitik in der Retrospektive ihrer Akteure’, *Bildung und Erziehung*, 40 (1987), 201–226; Hans-Werner Kuhn, ‘Stichwort Reeducation’, *Grundlagen der Weiterbildung*, 2 (1991), 207–210; Erich Weniger, ‘Die Epoche der Umerziehung 1945–1949’ (originally, 1959/1960), in Erich Weniger, *Erziehung, Politik, Geschichte* (Weinheim, 1990), 24–78; Hans Tietgens, and Norbert Vogel (eds), *Erwachsenenbildung im Kontext* (Bad Heilbrunn, 1991), especially 303–313; Hans-Werner Kuhn, Peter Messing, and Werner Skuhr (eds), *Politische Bildung in Deutschland* (Opladen, 1993), especially pp. 109–141. Furthermore, although not directly concerned with schools and universities, ‘Umerziehung’ is tied to denazification and democratization in, for example, Jutta B. Lange-Quassowski, *Neuordnung oder Restauration? Das Demokratiekonzept der amerikanischen Besatzungsmacht und die politische Sozialisation der Westdeutschen* (Opladen, 1979); Lutz Niethammer, *Die Mütläufefabrik. Die Entnazifizierung am Beispiel Bayern* (Berlin, 1982); Heiner Wember, *Umerziehung im Lager* (Essen, 1991)—the latter a rather polemical account of re-education in British internment camps. The policy and practice in American internment camps is discussed less critically in Christa Schick, ‘Die Internierungslager’, in Martin Broszat, Klaus-Dieter Henke, and Hans Woller (eds), *Von Stalingrad zur Währungsreform* (Munich, 1990), pp. 301–326.

the psychiatric notion of re-education as it was discussed prior to the end of the war, finding it vague and not worthy of serious study.¹⁴

Unfortunately, this view still holds. Various works analysing the British and French efforts at German re-education usually confine their interpretation to the realm of schools and universities without addressing the wider issue.¹⁵ They also often appear to assume that the American conception of re-education was thought out under the influence of Henry Morgenthau during the meetings of the interdepartmental committee which masterminded the draft version of Joint Chiefs of Staff Directive 1067 in the autumn and winter months of 1944.

Interestingly, in his introductory essay to his and Keith Wilson's volume on the political re-education of Germany and her allies after 1945, Nicholas Pronay argues that the Americans were intent on punitive measures to destroy German industrial capacity under the Morgenthau Plan whereas 'the British alternative was to go for the mind instead of the body'.¹⁶ As he explains: 'The Germans were to be re-educated to embrace the "rule of law"; "rechstat" (sic) instead of "real-politik" ... They were to be cured of militarism by learning to think of the soldier as a paid servant of the community rather than as an elite of the nation, and to unlearn that it was the state which legitimated the individual rather than the other way round. The realization of this policy was to involve the control and manipulation of opinion formation not only by the media but also by the agencies of attitude formation.'¹⁷

I shall argue in this article that the debate on the nature of democracy influenced the approach to the re-education of Germany. This debate high-

¹⁴ James F. Tent, *Mission on the Rhine: Re-education and Denazification in American Occupied Germany* (Chicago, 1982); Tent, 'Amerikanische Bildungspolitik im besetzten Deutschland 1945–1949', *Bildung und Erziehung*, 36 (1983), 5–17.

¹⁵ See, for instance, Günter Pakschies, *Umerziehung in der Britischen Zone 1945–1949* (Cologne and Vienna, 1984); Lothar Kettenacker, 'The Planning of "Re-education" during the Second World War', in Nicholas Pronay and Keith Wilson (eds), *The Political Re-education of Germany and Her Allies* (London, 1985), pp. 59–82; Kurt Jürgensen, 'The Concept and Practice of "Re-education" in Germany 1945–50', in Pronay and Wilson, *Re-education*, pp. 83–96; Arthur Hearnden, 'The Education Branch of the Military Government of Germany and the Schools', in Pronay and Wilson, *Re-education*, pp. 139–150 (apart from the chapters on education, the Pronay/Wilson book also contains articles on the press, and on newsreel and films, the latter referring to efforts in which the Americans were (also) involved); Jill Jones, 'Eradicating Nazism from the British Zone of Germany: Early Policy and Practice', *German History*, 8 (1990), 145–162; Rolf Lutzgebäck, *Die Bildungspolitik der Britischen Militärregierung im Spannungsfeld zwischen 'education' und 'reeducation' in ihrer Besatzungszone, insbesondere in Schleswig-Holstein und Hamburg in den Jahren 1945–1947* (2 parts) (Frankfurt, 1991). For France, see, for instance, Stefan Zauner, *Erziehung und Kulturmission. Frankreichs Bildungspolitik in Deutschland 1945–1949* (Munich, 1994).

¹⁶ Nicholas Pronay, 'To Stamp Out the Whole Tradition', in Pronay and Wilson, *Re-education*, 1–36, especially p. 1.

¹⁷ Ibid. The formula that the 'rule of law' was to be reinstated had been used, in an article reviewing the chances of democratization through (American) military government in 1943, by Harvard political scientist Carl J. Friedrich. He contrasted the 'rule of law' against the 'rule of men'. Friedrich, 'Military Government as a Step Toward Self-Rule', *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 7 (1943), 527–541.

lighted differences between the United States and the Germany of National Socialism, and suggested how Germany could eventually recuperate from fascism and become a normal modern democratic nation.

Psychiatry and psychology were first drawn into the scene of analysing and combating Nazi ideology when, mainly in 1940, interdisciplinary efforts were made by the social sciences to contribute to the preservation of democracy through research and information. In June 1940, the Harvard political scientist Carl J. Friedrich founded the Council for Democracy, a multidisciplinary voluntary association of scholars. It aimed to enhance Americans' loyalty to their democracy by making them understand the covert taken-for-granted meanings inherent in their American way of life.¹⁸ Shortly thereafter, the Committee for National Morale branched off from the Council for Democracy. Its secretary, Gregory Bateson, was a psychologist who had worked with, and was married to, the anthropologist Margaret Mead, who became closely involved in the Committee's work. The Committee was organized in some twenty subcommittees representing, among other sciences, physiology, psychiatry, psychology, history, and cultural anthropology, as well as the arts and the media. Each member was expected to contribute the knowledge of their discipline to the overall American understanding of Nazi propaganda, while maintaining their individual identity. The first major task undertaken was to compile an annotated bibliography on German psychological warfare, giving a comprehensive overview of German military and non-military publications on the topic since the turn of the century.¹⁹ Similarly, the Conference of Science, Philosophy and Religion in Their Relationship to the American Way of Life, which held its first symposium in New York in September 1940, devoted its annual meetings to such topics as the nature of democracy, education and world peace, the roots of aggressiveness, the meaning of freedom: among its members were such eminent social scientists as Gordon Allport, Gregory Bateson, Harold Lasswell, Kurt Lewin, Margaret Mead, Henry Murray, Talcott Parsons, Pitirim Sorokin, and Quincy Wright.²⁰

The year 1940 saw the start of intensive work which lasted throughout the war and into the post-war period. The Office of the Coordinator of Information

¹⁸ Cedric Larson, 'The Council for Democracy', *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 6 (1942), 284–290; Larson reports that the Council for Democracy was awarded *Variety* magazine's Plaque of Patriotic Leadership for 1941, honouring its service to the nation through 'successful translation of "basic values into understandable everyday terms"', p. 290.

¹⁹ Ladislas Farago, Gordon W. Allport, John G. Bebe-Center, Edwin G. Boring, Floyd L. Ruch, Stanley S. Stevens, and Kimball Young, *German Psychological Warfare* (New York, 1941); the topic of German propaganda equalling warfare was also addressed in Edmond Taylor, *The Strategy of Terror* (Boston, 1940), and in Ralph Ingersoll, *America Is Worth Fighting For* (Indianapolis, 1941).

²⁰ Some of the conference programmes and lists of participants are kept among the Parsons papers at Harvard University Archives (HUP (FP)- 15.2, box 6). See also: Gerhardt, 'Parsons' Sociology of National Socialism' (1993), p. 59; about Margaret Mead as a contributor to the Conference(s), see below (part 1, [3]), and Gerhardt, 'Margaret Mead's "Male and Female" Revisited', *International Sociology*, 18 (1995), esp. pp. 206–211.

(COI) was founded in June 1941, and later developed into two major agencies concerned with integrating research and the war effort, the OSS and the Office of War Information (OWI). Under this aegis, a large number of social scientists and psychiatrists became involved in serving the war aims through scholarly work.²¹ The War Department was interested in psychiatry from the outset. Initially, it was used to assess soldiers' fitness for missions necessitating truthfulness and integrity. Eventually it was also helpful in devising training courses in democracy for Germans in prisoner-of-war camps and for finding reliable anti-Nazis in occupied Germany after the war who could be safely trusted to help to build up a workable democracy. The latter, however, happened at a later stage of the story which I am about to tell from its multi-effort early phase.

1. Five Conceptual Approaches of Psychiatry and Psychology to Fascism

The Psychiatry of Crowd Behaviour

In his 1939 Salmon Lectures at the New York Academy of Medicine, Edward Strecker, senior psychiatrist at the University of Pennsylvania Medical School, applied psychiatry to the crowd under modern totalitarianism. He had been a major representative of the Mental Hygiene movement since the 1920s, and in the early 1930s had introduced preventive psychiatry into education under the label of 'psychiatric education'.²² In his lectures published under the title *Beyond the Clinical Frontiers*, Strecker extended Ortega y Gasset's philosophy of modern masses by claiming that a retreat from reality characterized not only psychosis but also modern mass society's members' normal state of mind. The 'normal' man, the mental patient, and the mob, he asserted, all replaced reality by fantasy either occasionally or consistently. The ensuing bias, prejudice, and intolerance led to violence but also to manic stupor-like conditions

²¹ The contribution of psychiatry to the selection of military personnel is documented in Henry A. Murray, 'Selective Service Psychiatry', *Psychiatry*, 4 (1941), 440–464; and The OSS Assessment Staff, *Assessment of Men. Selection of Personnel for the Office of Strategic Services* (New York, 1948); and psychiatry's contribution to non-military efforts in the war is documented in Frank J. Sladen (ed.), *Psychiatry and the War. A Survey of the Significance of Psychiatry and its Relation to Disturbances in Human Behavior to Help Provide for the Present War Effort and for Post War Needs* (Springfield, Ill., 1943). Some of the social science contribution is documented in a paper written in 1946–1948, by Talcott Parsons, entitled 'Social Science—a Basic National Resource', published in Samuel Klausner and Victor Lidz (eds), *The Nationalization of the Social Sciences* (Philadelphia, 1986), 41–112. Some major contributions within the Central-European Section of OSS are highlighted in Barry M. Katz, *Foreign Intelligence: Research and Analysis in the Office of Strategic Services 1942–1945* (Cambridge, 1989). For OWI, see, Winkler, *Politics of Propaganda* (1978). The contribution of cultural anthropology is documented in two articles: Clyde Kluckhohn and O. H. Mower, "'Culture and Personality': A Conceptual Scheme", *American Anthropologist*, 46 (1944), 1–30; Betty J. Meggers, 'Recent Trends in American Ethnology', *American Anthropologist*, 48 (1946), 176–214.

²² Edward A. Strecker, *Psychiatric Education* (New York, 1930). See also Kingsley Davis, 'Mental Hygiene and the Class Structure', *Psychiatry*, 1 (1938), 55–65.

bordering on somnambulism. These were accompanied by 'rationalizations of the crowd-man ... in the emotionalized group with a "mission"'.²³ During war, obsessive rituals, paranoia, and megalomania mobilized primitive drives, sweeping away all critical and ethical considerations.

To prevent further deterioration, Strecker suggested bolstering the critical and ethical aspects of modern action using moments 'when the crowd-man is not dominated by the crowd-unconsciousness'.²⁴ Treatment of crowd behaviour could not be done from hospitals where the patient was 'protected by the cloistered precincts . . . which in the matter of repressions are both protective and re-educational'.²⁵ The solution was mental hygiene.²⁶ Democracies, Strecker insisted, rely on intelligent minorities to analyse and deal with the problems of the modern world, one such group being psychiatry, as 'mental hygiene has all the makings of an important intelligent minority'.²⁷ It could counteract negative influences and strengthen moral responsibility. Such planning would encourage individual freedom and insight but yet be free from indoctrination. He stated:

Education is a much sounder hope for psychiatry and mental hygiene. At most there may be permitted enough propaganda to secure attention. There is a vast difference between propaganda and education. Education tries to teach understanding and reasoning; its teaching techniques are more or less objective; it aims at the production of independence of thought, and it is very wary of precipitate action.²⁸

Through such 're-educative' education, Strecker ventured, psychiatry (mental hygiene) could relieve the world of the whipped-up excesses of totalitarianism's crowds.

The Psychiatry and Psychology of Morale

When the Nazi army overran Poland in a three-week *Blitzkrieg* in September 1939, and less than a year later France's fall under the Nazi onslaught cemented the myth of German invincibility, the US revived its First World War interest in the problem of morale.²⁹ Harry Stack Sullivan, in an article in the *American Journal of Sociology*'s issue on 'National Morale' published in January 1941, focused on 'Psychiatric Aspects of Morale'.

²³ Edward A. Strecker, *Beyond the Clinical Frontiers. A Psychiatrist Views Crowd Behavior* (New York, 1940), p. 91.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 112.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 98.

²⁶ 'I doubt whether it is an overstatement to write that mental hygiene is less needed in the "inside" world, the world of the mentally sick, than in the "outside" world, the world of those who proudly boast of being normal.' *Ibid.*, p. 129.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 156.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 190. For the application of mental hygiene to American society as an antidote to potential weakness *vis-à-vis* fascism, see Harmon S. Ephron, 'Mental Hygiene in Social Reconstruction', *American Journal of Orthopsychiatry*, 10 (1940), 190–200.

²⁹ William Ernest Hocking, *Morale and Its Enemies* (New Haven, 1918).

On the negative side, he saw demoralization as the breakdown of the morale of an individual, group, or nation. This led to the abandoning of customary habits, inner disorientation, and eventual helplessness. 'This is the mental state', he wrote, 'of the people who, utterly involuntarily, have been such great help to the success of the *Blitzkrieg*. Great streams of them have littered military roads to the extent that supplies and reinforcements could not be gotten to the front.'³⁰

The positive sides of morale depended on voluntary group cohesion, which could be strengthened. He outlined seven principles for the democratic (re)construction of society. These were: (i) appealing to insight while giving information corroborated by facts; (ii) enhancing feelings of self-reliance; (iii) excluding persons with mental defects; (iv) striving to do one's best at all times; (v) leaders fully acknowledging their moral responsibility to act utterly competently in the interest of their followers; (vi) a general concern 'with the physical, the mental, and the spiritual hygiene of everyone'; and (vii) realistic commitment to an expectable good future.³¹

In similar vein, the Harvard psychologist Gordon Allport defined morale as 'a person's confidence in his ability to cope with whatever the future may bring',³² thereby contrasting current negativism with positive thinking, so necessary for the future. 'Assets in American morale' that had to be deliberately cultivated were, among others, a sense of humour, the habit of intense co-operation, a hatred of tyranny and persecution, and knowing that the division of labour alleviated anxiety.³³

³⁰ Harry Stack Sullivan, 'Psychiatric Aspects of Morale', *American Journal of Sociology*, 47 (1941), 282.

³¹ Ibid., 292–295. At the time, Sullivan focused on the US's defending its society against the Nazi onslaught, that is, preserving its democracy in the war and reconstructing it in the subsequent peace. He wrote: 'Practically everybody has not only to be changed from individualistic, self-reliant, to-heck-with-the-other-fellow attitude to an attitude of mutual support and protection, but must come actually to manifesting this in a society the structure of which must be distinctly paternalistic—authoritarian—in order to win in the fight on national socialism. Quite clearly, depending on how long they have been exposed to this new way of living, people will need more or less intensive assistance in the change from wartime to peacetime relationships with, we hope, restoration of the family as the unit out of which the social order is made'. Ibid., 295.

³² Gordon W. Allport, 'Liabilities and Assets in Civilian Morale', *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 216 (1941), 88, credits the definition to E. A. Rundquist and R. F. Sletto, *Personality in the Depression* (Minneapolis, 1936). Also Gordon W. Allport and Helene R. Veltfort, 'Social Psychology and the Civilian War Effort', *Journal of Social Psychology*, S.P.S.S.I. Bulletin, 18 (1943), 165–233.

³³ Allport, 'Liabilities and Assets', 93f. focused on 'The Future'. He ventured that liabilities (negativism) could be counteracted by 'campaigns of betterment', and assets (pro-democracy mentality) strengthened and multiplied. 'Civilian ability to meet the tempest ahead cannot be gauged entirely in terms of the present state of morale', he wrote while it was not yet clear whether America would fight totalitarianism and defend democracy. If that happened, he was sure, 'we rely upon American realism, hatred of tyranny, wholeness of personality, inventiveness, humor, and teamwork, and upon potentials as yet unreleased and up to now unknown'. See also Gordon W. Allport, 'Liberalism and the Motives of Men', *Frontiers of Democracy*, 6 (1940), 126–137, Edward E. Tolman, 'Psychological Man', *Journal of Social Psychology*, S.P.S.S.I. Bulletin, 13 (1941), 205–218. The problem tackled is also discussed in R. A. Brotemarkle,

The American Psychiatric Association formed a Military Mobilization Committee. In 1942, it issued a publication on civilian mental health in wartime entitled *Psychiatric Aspects of Civilian Morale*. Its four main parts were concerned with 'Social institutions during periods of stress', 'Anxiety and its control', 'Morale and its control', and 'Fatigue and its control'. Morale was defined both by individual commitment and group cohesion.³⁴ These topics were taken from community psychiatry which had emerged from the Mental Hygiene movement of the 1930s.³⁵

Cultural Anthropology and the Psychology of National Character

In the 1930s, cultural anthropologists studied South Sea cultures and found basic personality patterns that were the outcome of socialization.³⁶ Comparative analysis of American society and culture by anthropologist Margaret Mead led some to question whether democracy could be fostered through circumspect use of insights derived from the study of primitive society.³⁷

In this context, Mead called war an 'invention'. Since some cultures did not practice warfare, she maintained, it could scarcely be a necessary outlet for biological drives. As a vehicle for social integration it had become 'a defective institution' due to 'its terrible cost in human suffering and social waste', and so Mead felt that now was the time for 'teaching people . . . the invention of new methods which will render warfare as out-of-date as the tractor is making the plow'.³⁸

Education, Mead suggested, should cultivate democratic values, although with two provisos. One was that social scientists are involved in devising

'Development of Military Morale in a Democracy', *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 216 (1941), 79–87. Other work by Allport before the US entry into World War II includes the biographical study on 'My Life Before and After January 30, 1933'. See: G. W. Allport, J. S. Bruner, E. M. Jandorf, 'Personality Under Social Catastrophe: Ninety Life-Histories of the Nazi Revolution', *Character and Personality*, 10 (1941/42), 1–22. A sizable number of the 234 life histories collected for the entire study was elicited by Edward Hartshorne who, with Allport and Fay, was one of the organizers of the 'contest' which served as a stimulus for the respondents to write up their biographies related to Nazism.

³⁴ Military Mobilization Committee of the American Psychiatric Association, *Psychiatric Aspects of Civilian Morale* (New York, 1942).

³⁵ For further sources, see Walter R. Bion, 'The "War of Nerves": Civilian Reaction, Morale and Prophylaxis', in Emanuel Miller (ed.), *The Neuroses in War* (New York, 1940), pp. 180–200; National Council of Mental Hygiene, *Maintaining the Stability of the Individual* (New York, 1940).

³⁶ Margaret Mead, *Growing Up in New Guinea* (New York, 1930); *Kinship in the Admiralty Islands*, American Museum of Natural History Anthropology Papers (Vol. 34, Pt. II; Washington, 1934); Ruth Benedict, *Patterns of Culture* (London, 1935); Abraham Kardiner, *The Individual and His Society* (New York, 1939).

³⁷ Margaret Mead, *And Keep Your Powder Dry. An Anthropologist Looks at America* (New York, 1943). See also her articles: 'The Use of Primitive Material in the Study of Personality', *Character and Personality*, 3 (1934), 3–16; 'Our Educational Emphasis in Primitive Perspective', *American Journal of Sociology*, 48 (1943), 633–639.

³⁸ Margaret Mead, 'Warfare Is Only An Invention—Not A Biological Necessity', *Asia*, 40 (1940), 405.

culture change in order that scientific methods and knowledge could be an antidote to state interference and indoctrination. The other was that plans must not be devised for some ultimate and specific aim of culture change: merely setting the direction sufficed. This dealt with the dilemma that science might thwart spontaneity and destroy independence of thinking: 'Only by devoting ourselves to a direction, not a fixed goal, to a process, not a static system, to the development of human beings who will choose and think the choice all important and be strong, healthy and wise in choosing, can we escape this dilemma', wrote Mead.³⁹

Together with psychologist Gregory Bateson, Mead stated that national or social character could be changed if cultural value standards were carefully if imperceptibly re-adapted.⁴⁰ Bateson applied the idea to German national character, expecting that such asymmetrical behavioural patterns as dominance-submission could be converted into symmetrical ones like 'fair play'.⁴¹

The Psychology of Leadership Values

Another voice came from the field of vector psychology. 'Building a world of peace—if and when we have won—which will be worth at least the name "better than before" includes many problems: political, economic, and cultural', wrote emigré psychologist Kurt Lewin in 1943 under the title of 'Cultural Reconstruction'. He, too, stressed 'education for independence':

To encourage change toward democracy . . . would include . . . increased emphasis on human values as against superhuman values, such as the state, politics, science. It would emphasize what the German 'Iron Chancellor' Bismarck has called far back in 1880 *Civilcourage* (moral courage of the civilians) and what he deplored as lacking in the German character (as against the courage and the blind obedience of the soldier).⁴²

To make it clear that this could be done, Lewin turned to his own research. He and his research associates had found that three types of leadership yielded different results for group co-operation, namely, authoritarian, laissez-faire, and democratic.⁴³ Germans, he contended, had never come to know demo-

³⁹ Margaret Mead, 'The Comparative Study of Culture and the Purposive Cultivation of Democratic Values', in Second Symposium of the Conference on Science, Philosophy and Religion in Their Relationship to the Democratic Way of Life, *Science, Philosophy and Religion* (New York, 1942), 68.

⁴⁰ Gregory Bateson and Margaret Mead, 'Principles of Morale Building', *Journal of Educational Sociology*, 15 (1941), 206–220.

⁴¹ Gregory Bateson, 'Morale and National Character', in Goodwin Watson (ed.), *Civilian Morale. Second Yearbook of the Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues* (Boston, 1942), 71–91.

⁴² Kurt Lewin, 'Cultural Reconstruction', *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 38 (1943), 168.

⁴³ Kurt Lewin and Ronald Lippitt, 'An Experimental Approach to the Study of Autocracy and Democracy: A Preliminary Note', *Sociometry*, 1 (1938), 292–300; Kurt Lewin, 'Experiments in Social Space', *Harvard Educational Review*, 9 (1939), 21–32; Ronald Lippitt, 'An Experimental Study of the Effect of Democratic and Authoritarian Group Atmospheres', *Studies in Topological*

cratic social leadership. They needed instruction in democratic leadership from American and other occupying armies after the war. He suggested:

This training does not need to bear the stigma of 'education', because a job is to be done, a job of cooperation in the interest of Germany. It could be demonstrated there and experienced first hand that 'democracy works better'. If strategically managed, such training on the job of leaders and trainers of leaders might well reach into every aspect of community leadership. It might help to set in motion a process of self-reeducation.⁴⁴

The Psychiatry of Cultural Paranoia

Richard A. Brickner, a neuropsychiatrist at Columbia University's College of Physicians and Surgeons, made an unequivocally psychiatric diagnosis of fascist actions and attitudes. He realized that destructiveness, persecution, and self-aggrandisement in Germany followed the normal pattern of paranoia: 'Displayed before us is the conduct on a mass scale which, were it shown by an individual, could be handled by the employment of well-known principles',⁴⁵ he wrote. Furthermore:

The national group we call Germany behaves and has long behaved startlingly like an individual involved in a dangerous mental trend. Although many individual Germans may not partake in this trend, the mass actions of the German nation are and, for over a century, have been typical of what the psychiatrist finds in certain highly alarming types of individual behavior . . . Clinical experience can identify the specific condition that Germany's mental trend approaches. It is paranoia, as grim an ill as mind is heir to, the most difficult to treat, the only mental condition that frightens the psychiatrist himself—because, unless checked, it may end in murder. Murder is the logical dénouement of its special outlook on the world.⁴⁶

Brickner's *Is Germany Incurable?* (1943) carried introductions by Margaret Mead and Edward Strecker. Mead found the book to be proof of how necessary social science was for post-war democracy. Strecker joined Brickner in hypothesizing that 'the paranoia of a group, such as Germany . . . perhaps . . . can be cured . . . through a well-thought-out, thorough plan of reeducation, of reculturing, such as Dr. Brickner suggests'.⁴⁷

The book elaborated four major cultural trends in Germany which resemble the outlook of a paranoid. These were megalomania, the need to dominate,

and Vector Psychology 1, *University of Iowa Studies of Child Welfare*, 16 (1940), 43–195; John R. P. French Jr., 'The Disruption and Cohesion of Groups', *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 36 (1941), 361–377; Alex Bavelas, 'Morale and the Training of Leaders', in Watson (ed.), *Civilian Morale*, 143–165; see also: Mitchell G. Ash, 'Cultural Contexts and Scientific Change in Psychology. Kurt Lewin in Iowa', *American Psychologist*, 47 (1992), 198–207.

⁴⁴ Kurt Lewin, 'The Special Case of Germany', *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 7 (1943), 566.

⁴⁵ Richard A. Brickner, 'The German Cultural Paranoid Trend', *American Journal of Orthopsychiatry*, 12 (1942), 611.

⁴⁶ Richard A. Brickner, *Is Germany Incurable?* (Philadelphia, 1943), p. 30.

⁴⁷ Edward A. Strecker, 'Introduction', in Brickner, *Is Germany Incurable?*, p. 18.

a persecution complex in conjunction with the projection of inner tendencies on chosen enemies, and the retrospective falsification of fact irreconcilable with the world view or whim of leaders ('mystification'). The German war cult and the recent German race cult had become grandiose rationalizations for eliminating 'enemies' in self-righteous 'protection' of 'Aryan' purity, wrote Brickner, and he stressed that an ideology of *Herrenvolk* promoted imperialist warfare and ruthless subterfuge against the entire world. The book's final chapter outlined some methods for making Germany more like other nations. Were it a patient, Brickner contended, the solution would be re-education. The psychiatrist treating a paranoid by this then familiar therapy addressed those parts of the patient's personality not yet affected by paranoia (called 'clear' by Brickner). By gradually extending such clear areas, the psychiatrist was able to help the patient to recover. Brickner realized that a defeated country such as Germany could not be expected to start its rehabilitation without help. He therefore suggested American intervention:

Resources or imagination to put into effect a programme of psychiatric rehabilitation . . . must come from outside—from among the victors . . . The crucial factor in an individual case is the presence of a sufficient mental area remaining clear to act as a point of departure. If the Germany-group contains a sizable number of individuals, however unorganized and unaware of one another, whose emotional values are prevailingly non-paranoid, the outside world has a clear area at hand to work with and out from in treating the Germany-group case.⁴⁸

2. The Psychoanalysis of Character Structure

A related but separate field of arguments relied on psychoanalysis. It was based on the work of Sigmund Freud and his collaborators and disciples who first addressed the processes of superego and ego functioning in mass psychology in the early 1920s.⁴⁹ From the late 1920s onwards, Freud's approach had been reformulated into psychoanalytic 'characterology' which allowed for the investigation of national character but also facilitated the diagnosis of culturally based mass neurosis.⁵⁰ Although Freud himself touched upon the topic of National Socialism in several of his writings, a full psychoanalytic

⁴⁸ Brickner, *Is Germany Incurable?*, pp. 304–305.

⁴⁹ Sigmund Freud, 'Massenpsychologie und Ich-Analyse' (1921), translated as *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego* (transl. James Strachey) (New York, 1989).

⁵⁰ See, for instance, Franz Alexander, *Psychoanalyse der Gesamtpersönlichkeit* (Leipzig, 1927) (translated as *Psychoanalysis of the Total Personality* (New York and Washington, 1930)); Erich Fromm, 'Die psychoanalytische Charakterologie und ihre Bedeutung für die Sozialforschung', *Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung*, 1 (1932), 253–277 (translated in Fromm, *The Crisis of Psychoanalysis* (New York, 1971)); Karen Horney, *The Neurotic Personality of Our Time* (New York, 1937); *New Ways of Psychoanalysis* (New York, 1939). As a student, Horney had studied psychoanalysis in Berlin (1922–1924), as noted by Edith Kurzweil, *The Freudians* (New Haven and London, 1989), p. 45. For the psychoanalytic discussion of national character, see Otto Klineberg, 'A Science of National Character', *American Scientist*, 32 (1944), 273–285.

analysis of contemporary political and social structures was undertaken by non-orthodox neo-analysts such as Erich Fromm or Franz Alexander.

In 1936, the exiled Frankfurt Institute of Social Research published a two-volume study entitled *Studies in Authority and Family*. It summed up more than five years of research on the part played by the authoritarian German family structure in capitalism's need for unconditional obedience. According to the 'Frankfurt School' this demand reached its apogee in fascism. In one of the three introductory essays on the theory of authoritarianism, 'Sozialpsychologischer Teil', Fromm argued that the repression of sexual needs in the German family led to superego supremacy in the personality. A result of this excessive family control was that the superego remained dependent on external authorities, enabling them in turn to direct the psychological processes of large parts of the German population. Amoral authorities such as those of National Socialism could thus readily induce the Germans to mass destructiveness and acquiescence in crime.⁵¹

After his emigration to the US, Fromm broadened the extent of his analysis of modern social character. He asked why Germans and, indeed, most Americans appeared to shun freedom and prefer subservience to frequently amoral authorities. In *Escape From Freedom*, published in 1941, he stated that individuality and uniqueness of personality, the safeguards of culture, were endangered by three psychological mechanisms fostered by acquisitive capitalism. One was authoritarianism, entailing a pattern of domination over inferiors and submission to superiors. The second was 'automaton conformity', doing what is expected by outside authorities irrespective of their moral quality or the nature of the required action. The third mechanism was pure destructiveness. These three substitutions (*ersatz*) for productivity in competitive capitalism thwarted individuality. Fromm saw the solution not in mass psychoanalytic therapy but in economic change. He concluded:

The victory of freedom is possible only if democracy develops into a society . . . in which the individual is not subordinated to or manipulated by any power outside of himself, be it the State or the economic machine. . . The irrational and planless character of society must be replaced by a planned economy that represents the planned and concerted effort of society as such.⁵²

Franz Alexander, emigré director of the Chicago Institute of Psychoanalysis, diagnosed imbalances in economic and psychological progress as the source of modern totalitarianism. In *Our Age of Unreason* (1942), he argued that insecurity and disorganization had arisen from the imbalance between fast

⁵¹ Erich Fromm, 'Theoretische Entwürfe über Autorität und Familie. Sozialpsychologischer Teil', in Max Horkheimer, Erich Fromm, Herbert Marcuse (eds), *Studien über Autorität und Familie. Forschungsberichte aus dem Institut für Sozialforschung* (Paris, 1936), pp. 77–135; 'Zum Gefühl der Ohnmacht', *Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung*, 6 (1937), 95–119; see also Ernest Jones 'The Psychology of Quislingism', *International Journal of Psycho-Analysis*, 22 (1941), 1–6.

⁵² Erich Fromm, *Escape from Freedom* (New York, 1941), p. 192.

economic change and slow cultural change: a philosophy of violence bridged the gap. In Germany, Nazi ascendancy to power was based on the masses' discontent with democracy's inability to secure citizens' social and economic status and well-being. The Nazi seizure of power, however, was cemented by Nazism's pagan religion which liberated hitherto repressed forces of aggression, revenge, and lust for power.⁵³ Yet the answer did not lie in renouncing force, pacifism being an inadequate response to rampant destructiveness. War, Alexander stated in an article on 'War and Peace' (1941), was not a mass psychosis but a social form providing abreaction for innate aggressiveness. History proved that aggressiveness could be kept in check through political organization and this was the way to go in future. Since dominant nations or societies were usually those with superior coercive power, the key to post-war peace would be to win the war and exploit the fruits of victory in a responsible way. Anticipating the post-war situation as one where dominant/victorious nations would exert influence on dependent/defeated nations, he insisted 'that the superior power enforcing the new supranational organization should be a democracy'.⁵⁴ This would destroy authoritarian régimes founded on mass terror.

For Alexander, the modern dilemma was that the world was becoming tighter and more thoroughly organized. This favoured strong and authoritarian régimes over democracies, which must guard themselves against weakness originating in their innate non-assertiveness. Outweighing this potential problem is the fact that only democracies can engender social humaneness, which was 'the internal psychological control of the human conscience (superego)', resulting from 'an educational process . . . supported by religion'.⁵⁵ From this he concluded:

The only way out of this dilemma is that democracies finally recognize their historical vocation to assume leadership toward a new league of nations. This must be based at first both on justice and on armed force, the latter to be discarded only gradually at the same pace as the indispensable psychological ally in man's personality gains strength. This internal ally, a slowly growing product of education, is an advanced form of humanism which does not stop at economic, linguistic, or racial borders.⁵⁶

3. The Conference 'Germany After The War'

The five approaches of psychology and psychiatry converged with psychoanalysis in a conference that took place in five meetings lasting between

⁵³ Franz Alexander, *Our Age of Unreason. A Study of Irrational Forces in Social Life* (Philadelphia, 1942), p. 106.

⁵⁴ Franz Alexander, 'Psychiatric Aspects of War and Peace', *American Journal of Sociology*, 46 (1941), 519. For Alexander's contribution to the discussion of disorganization which followed from, among other things, Lasswell's 'Psychology of Hitlerism' in the 1930s, see Franz Alexander, 'Psychoanalysis and Social Disorganization', *American Journal of Sociology*, 42 (1936/37), 781–813.

⁵⁵ Alexander, 'War and Peace', 511–512.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, 520.

one and three days each, during April to June 1944, the 100-page report of which was completed in mid-November 1944. The title was 'Germany After the War', sponsored by the State Department together with the War Department, and organized by Richard Brickner. Invitations were sent to thirty selected participants and some further thirty-eight consultants, guests, and advisors, by the Joint Committee on Postwar Planning representing the American Association on Mental Deficiency, American Branch of the International League against Epilepsy, American Neurological Association, American Orthopsychiatric Association, American Psychiatric Association, American Society for Research on Psychosomatic Problems, and the National Committee for Mental Hygiene. Among the thirty participants were twenty physicians (psychiatrists, psychoanalysts, neurologists, and clinicians), two sociologists, two psychologists, one anthropologist, one educationalist, and one philosopher. Among them were Franz Alexander, Alvan Barach, Lauretta Bender, Lyman Bryson, Richard Crutchfield, Lawrence K. Frank, Frank Fremont-Smith, Thomas French, Ives Hendrick, Lawrence Kubie, Margaret Mead, Adolf Meyer, Gardner Murphy, Harry Overstreet, Talcott Parsons, and Tracy Putnam. Among the guests and advisors were Erik Erikson, Erich Fromm, and Kurt Lewin.

The conference set itself three topic areas: i) immediate dealings with Germany; ii) long-term plans with respect to Germany; iii) possible reactions among the democratic peoples in support of or opposition to these decisions and plans.

The report's ten appendices⁵⁷ included memoranda by Lawrence K. Frank, Margaret Mead, and Talcott Parsons, among others. The ten-page report, with ninety pages of appendices, tackled the topic in the following manner:⁵⁸

*The Psychocultural Approach.*⁵⁹ A national culture, government, or economy, it was said, contained 'different patterns of endeavor and of life careers which the cultural traditions and the social order offer to individuals as design for living'.⁶⁰

*Regularities in German National Character.*⁶¹ In principle, German national character contained two antagonistic elements. This dualism was never integrated but remained in delicate and ambivalent balance: There was 'Type A':

⁵⁷ An anonymous article entitled 'Germany After the War. Roundtable—1945', *American Journal of Orthopsychiatry* 15 (1945), 381–441, contains the full text of the ten appendices of the *Report of a Conference on Germany After the War*. It was completed in November, 1944. Typewritten, no place or date, marked 'Confidential' (crossed out), it is stored in Harvard University's Widener Library. The article referred to a one-day conference in April 1945 which, however, was a follow-up to, and the only public recognition of, the five secret meetings that had taken place between April and June, 1944.

⁵⁸ Among the parts of the argument outlined as appendices, Frank's, Mead's, Brickner's, and Parsons' memoranda were the first four.

⁵⁹ 'Germany After the War', 382–386.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, 385.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, 386–395.

emotional, idealistic, active, romantic, maybe constructive or destructive and antisocial. Type B: orderly, hard-working, hierarchy-preoccupied, methodical, submissive, gregarious, materialistic. . . Type A is frustrated at each point in the life cycle. Impulses are stimulated only to be frustrated. . . Type B behavior is social behavior, manifested in an hierarchical world; from the behavior spring all other social rewards. . . Type A behavior can be expected to be manifested when the libidinal urge becomes stronger. . . Since type B behavior gives by definition less emotional pleasure than type A, there always remains a yearning for type A behavior. . . Nazism made possible more type A behavior after adolescence than any previous régime'.⁶² The two elements merged to form a national character heavily imbued with concern for status. A common German tendency was to gauge oneself and others on a hierarchy of some sort, the ubiquitous question being, 'Am I maintaining my status or is it being threatened in any way?'.⁶³

*Some Specific Applications of the Regularities of German National Character.*⁶⁴ Dualism within a national character structure not only invited paranoid tendencies in the individual, guarding his social status against 'enemies' anywhere, but also favoured cultural paranoid tendencies once the A component had flowed into projections of national grandeur. Militarism thus acquired a heroic meaning, and 'cleansing' the world from 'infectious' evil—such as was epitomized by 'the' Jew—became a German aim. Therefore, it is plain that it would be folly to think of managing postwar Germany merely by encouraging her to change ideologies. . . The only democratic point of view which could have any value would have to spring from a new kind of character. The Germans would have to develop in such a way as to think of democracy themselves, to conceive it, want it and create it.⁶⁵

*The Problem of Controlled Institutional Change.*⁶⁶ Thought was given to social systems in general, it being essential to determine an optimal point for transition to democracy. Motivation for behaviour often originated in 'vested' interests entrenched in institutional structures favouring privileges or directing choices. 'Definitions of the situation' could be changed by re-directing or re-ordering institutional structures. Such change meant deliberate influences on existing elements of the social system. 'Controlled institutional change' was not to intrude directly into individuals' private spheres but was to affect 'impersonal' spheres such as the economic-occupational structure.

*Short Term Procedures in the Management of Germany.*⁶⁷ Nazis had to be prevented from exerting any influence in the immediate post-war period. This

⁶² Ibid., 392.

⁶³ Ibid., 389.

⁶⁴ Ibid., 395–397.

⁶⁵ Ibid., 396–397.

⁶⁶ Ibid., 397–404.

⁶⁷ Ibid., 404–410.

meant: (i) Complete military defeat to forestall any hope for the future restoration of German glory; (ii) complete disarmament to destroy the means for future military force; (iii) punishment of war criminals to mete out justice for German crimes (carrying out such justice, however, should not be in the hands of the Germans lest it be just a sham⁶⁸); (iv) removal of culturally inimical people, Nazis being dispersed to distant places if there was no other way to break their spell over the population; and (v) relief administration that was to be located in schools turned into medical and welfare centres, thus associating education with well-being and also enhancing the prestige of female relief workers relative to their husbands' intrafamilial authority.

*Long-Term Procedures in the Management of Germany.*⁶⁹ A span of two generations (40–60 years) would be needed to alter the institutional structure. The eventual general aim was economic security, if only because 'economic insecurity is never good, and in a culturally paranoid nation is a threat to its neighbors'.⁷⁰ The political aim was to reduce loyalty to the monolithic state and strengthen decentralized and civilian forces. There were four fields of long-term policy: (i) Education should be administered by Germans, but only after schools and universities had been purged of Nazi personnel and textbooks imbued with Nazism had been replaced. Extracurricular education and other non-elitist forms of schooling were to be introduced. Surveillance of the school system by a United Nations committee on educational reconstruction was recommended. (ii) The German home was to be left to change indirectly as a result of economic-occupational liberation. Authoritarianism in the family, however, must be combated in the interests of children, for whom all people had a moral responsibility: German children should receive special attention. (iii) The Civil Service was to be freed from 'hierarchy, authoritarianism, formalism, and status-consciousness'⁷¹ by a relatively minor change, namely, a 'policy... to facilitate effective, not merely formal, equality of opportunity in the civil service'.⁷² (iv) The training of the police should be based on civilian rather than military lines: 'New police systems could be evolved entirely from

⁶⁸ Ibid., 405: 'It would be fatal to forget the barbarities, Rotterdam, Lidice, mass executions of Jews, the murders of war prisoners, and many other extreme atrocities which are too well known to require mention. Germans cannot be allowed to shrug their shoulders at these deeds, nor plead ignorance, nor find ways of blaming their enemies for them. These acts were committed by Germans in the name of Germany.' To be sure, the concentration camps were not mentioned. The fact that only after April–May 1945, when abhorrence of concentration camps led General Eisenhower to invite twelve American publishers to see for themselves the evidence of Nazi atrocities, were these deeds of genocide publicized worldwide is documented by Norbert Frei. 'Wir waren blind, ungläubig und langsam.' Buchenwald, Dachau und die amerikanischen Medien im Frühjahr 1945', *Vierteljahreshefte für Zeitgeschichte*, 35 (1987), 385–401.

⁶⁹ 'Germany After the War', 410–418.

⁷⁰ Ibid., 411.

⁷¹ Ibid., 418.

⁷² Ibid.

among civilians without doing violence to any of the principles we have discussed'.⁷³

*Economic and Political Considerations.*⁷⁴ These concerned Germans' contribution to their transition to democracy. Germans' pride and entrenched nationalism would make them vigorously reject any programme of democratization imposed upon them. The report said: 'Proposals to destroy the industry of Germany altogether and to move the industrial concentration eastward cannot be judged by psychiatrists as to their practicality. That they would meet with immense and bitter opposition among the Germans is evident enough.'⁷⁵ The Allies were not to appear soft or charitable, Germans regarding this with contempt, but they were to work towards full employment because 'the manpower of Germany must be kept at work on some reasonable level of real wages'.⁷⁶ In this vein, new forms of social relations were to be introduced in industry: 'The people have been taught to think that their brutal social hierarchies have been the efficient cause of their technological success. Experience in democratically controlled industry and democratic agencies of social control would be constructive and they might be set up in international operations.'⁷⁷

*The Problem of Management of Germany in the Light of Motivation Dominant in a Democracy.*⁷⁸ Any re-education could have a negative effect on German attitudes. The Allies (as prospective military government authorities) were to refrain from assuming more power than was essential for Germany's change and to assume that power only as long as it was necessary. They were not to impose restrictions on Germany that might later be condemned as unwarranted meddling in the internal affairs of another nation.

*Possible Reactions of the American People.*⁷⁹ Military government was to be aware of six possible American reactions: (i) Short memory could cause Americans to want to be 'good fellows' with Germans; (ii) war fatigue could lead them to 'wash our hands of the whole affair'; (iii) Germans might attribute the new measures to American 'materialism', which in turn would alienate Americans; (iv) German pleading that the harsh treatment unnecessarily hurt the innocent might arouse guilt feelings followed by misplaced Allied generosity; (v) the traditionally positive American attitude to Germans might return; and (vi) oversimplification of the German problem could occur: 'There is a considerable tendency to identify the Nazis as the villains of the play and

⁷³ Ibid.

⁷⁴ Ibid., 418–424.

⁷⁵ Ibid., 421.

⁷⁶ Ibid.

⁷⁷ Ibid., 424.

⁷⁸ Ibid., 424–427.

⁷⁹ Ibid., 427–431.

to believe that the defeat and drastic punishment of them will settle the whole problem of the future.⁸⁰

Brickner's conference report united two opposing views, both discussed vigorously at the conference. Talcott Parsons' papers kept in the Harvard University Archives contain handwritten notes on some topics discussed during the April meeting. A controversy developed between two psychoanalysts: Thomas French, a collaborator of Alexander, agreed with Mead and Parsons that the originally constructive elements of German mentality had been displaced by destructive ones. Only a change of institutions in Germany could neutralize the negative dualism in the German national character, the Allied control over education being wholly inadequate for such a task. On the opposing side, Lawrence Kubie, who belonged to a group of New York based mental hygienists, insisted that nothing but repression could control German aggressiveness, and therefore only United Nations supervision could avert an otherwise inevitable failure of German re-education.⁸¹

Parsons himself, who had originally contributed a short memorandum on 'The Problem of Intervention in German Society', completely revised his memorandum between August and October 1944. In a major essay he provided a sociologically grounded alternative to Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau Jr.'s plan, which itself differed from the War Department's Civil Affairs Division's plans for post-war Germany.⁸² Brickner used Parsons'

⁸⁰ Ibid., 431.

⁸¹ Folder 'Conference on Germany', Parsons papers in the Harvard University Archives, call number HUG(FP)-15.2., box 10. For further elaboration on the view presented by Kubie, see, for instance, the contributions to Ernst Simmel (ed.), *Anti-Semitism. A Social Disease* (New York, 1946). For an interpretation, Uta Gerhardt, *Ideas About Illness. An Intellectual and Political History of Medical Sociology* (New York, 1990), pp. 18, 64–67.

⁸² After having organized the Bretton Woods Conference that established the International Monetary Fund and World Bank for post-war reconstruction, Morgenthau learned about the *OWI Country Handbook Germany* designed as a guideline for military government when he visited Britain in early August, 1944. He intervened with President Roosevelt who agreed with Morgenthau that the *Handbook*'s policy planning disregarded the necessity of preventing Germany's future resurrection as a belligerent. During the following months, Roosevelt withdrew from the radical standpoint taken by Morgenthau but had the *Handbook* revised. Eventually, in February–April 1945, JCS Directive 1067 secured that military government policy would not appease militarism. See *Handbook for Military Government in Germany Prior to Defeat Or Surrender* (no date or place of publication; Washington, December 1944); Henry Morgenthau Jr., *Germany is Our Problem* (New York, 1945); John W. Snell, *Wartime Origins of the Dilemma over Germany* (New Orleans, 1959), esp. pp. 64–93; Frederick H. Gareau, 'Morgenthau's Plan for Industrial Disarmament', *The Western Political Quarterly* 14 (1961), 517–534. For the War Department's Civil Affairs Division (CAD) as well as general policy planning regarding Germany, see Henry Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, *On Active Service in Peace and War* (New York, 1947), particularly pp. 568–583. John J. McCloy, 'American Occupation Policies in Germany', in *Proceedings of the Academy of Political Sciences*, vol. 21, edited by John A. Krout (New York, 1946), pp. 540–551, as then Assistant Secretary of War said in a speech or paper that appears to have been delivered in late 1945: 'I have given you some of the short-range objectives which either have been achieved in Germany or are well on the way to being achieved in Germany. Our objectives, however, cannot all be negative ones. If Germany is not to be a burden on the American taxpayer, constructive steps have to be taken to enable the German people to work

memorandum in one section of the report and also in short passages in the second half. Parsons published his full text separately in *Psychiatry*⁸³ early in 1945, although his argument was already known among military and other personnel concerned with post-war policy for Germany through the report's distribution at SHAEF and in Washington.

Parsons' idea of permissive control takes up Brickner's idea of the psychiatrist's working from the 'clear' areas, albeit in a context of economic change: such areas could be the mainspring for Germany's restoration. His standpoint was that if the sentimental-idealistic and the hardworking-materialistic components of German national character could be separated, and if the former could be re-directed to apolitical realms while the latter were altered and strengthened, Germans would lose interest in aggression. Three types of social control should be administered by military government to achieve this aim, namely, the regressive, the permissive, and the direct. In more detail: 'regressive' control meant that the recent regression from—in Max Weber's terms—rational-legal type of authority in society to traditionalism (patrimonialism) should be stopped. This required strengthening the authority of laws rather than that of men, to use Friedrich's phrase, through establishing constitutionalism,⁸⁴ and replacing ascription by achievement as both status and value orientations.⁸⁵ This made the economic-occupational sphere a preferred

out their own political and economic reconversion' (1946, p. 546). For the allegedly lenient policy outlined in the original *Handbook*, and for its reversal through Morgenthau, but also for its clandestine re-reversal when the American and British zones of occupation were merged into an economic union at the end of 1946, see the account given by Harold Zink who also masterminded the version of the *Handbook* that was scrapped following Morgenthau's intervention in August 1944. Harold Zink, *American Military Government of Germany* (New York, 1947), especially pp. 187–196, 'The Economic Programme'. For the relationship between this 'new economic policy' and the Morgenthau-Plan, see W. W. Rostow, *The Division of Europe after World War II: 1946* (Austin, 1981). The CAD policies throughout the period of 1944–1946 are described in Earl F. Ziemke, *The US Army in the Occupation of Germany 1944–1946* (Washington, D.C., 1975). Parsons, it appears, was in agreement with what developed into the eventual official economic reconstruction policy for Germany. See Uta Gerhardt, 'Talcott Parsons and the Transformation of German Society at the End of World War II' (forthcoming).

⁸³ Talcott Parsons, 'The Problem of Controlled Institutional Change', *Psychiatry*, 8 (1945), 79–101; see also Uta Gerhardt, 'Medizin, Soziologie und Re-Education', in Uta Gerhardt, *Gesellschaft und Gesundheit* (Frankfurt 1991), pp. 261–300; 'Parsons' Sociology of National Socialism' (1993), pp. 53–57.

⁸⁴ In principle, Parsons felt that National Socialism was charismatic rule—in Weberian terms—which, through the routinization of charisma, tended towards that most atavistic form of traditionalism, patrimonialism. See Parsons, 'Max Weber and the Contemporary Political Crisis' (1942), in Gerhardt, *Parsons on National Socialism*, especially pp. 173–181. The identification of constitutionalism with democracy ('rule of law' instead of 'rule of men') was adopted from Carl J. Friedrich, *Constitutional Government and Democracy* (Boston, 1941), which was a revised version of *Constitutional Government and Politics. Nature and Development* (New York, 1937). In 1943, Friedrich used the plea for constitutionalism as a justification for his suggestion that military government in a liberated Germany and Japan should use absolute rule to establish 'rule of law'. See Carl J. Friedrich, 'Military Government as a Step Toward Self-Rule', *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 7 (1943), 531–541.

⁸⁵ That achievement is connected to equality of opportunity through democratization of the social structure, as in America, whereas ascription signals non-democratic value-orientations, as

locus of planned change, for which Parsons suggested 'permissive' control. Economic institutions themselves allowed individuals to achieve status by their own work and reach security on their own accord, and thus, he said, re-industrialization and even a full-employment economy would achieve peace. He wrote:

The essential thing is that there should be a policy of fostering a highly productive, full-employment, expanding economy for Germany. The inherent tendencies of the modern industrial economy are such that, if this is achieved, its influence on institutional change will be automatically in the right direction. Conversely, tendencies to particularism, the breakdown of functional specialization, overemphasis on group solidarity are overwhelmingly defensive reactions to the insecurity attendant on a contracting field of opportunity. It is not modern industrialism as such, but its pathology and the incompleteness of its development which fosters these phenomena.⁸⁶

The third type of control, 'direct', reduced the chances for any political expression of sentimentalism: anti-Semitism and other racist ideologies must be outlawed. Controlled institutional change as a policy of democratizing Germany included punishment of war criminals, destruction of the *Junker* class and the military caste, and elimination of the Nazi party. Yet positive action was also called for, focusing on industry, the only structural element that German or Nazi society had in common with Western democracies. From this perspective, the economic-occupational realm was the 'clear' element which was to be strengthened by reconstruction policies which would incidentally also change the German mind.

4. Some Facets of Occupation Policy

The principle of re-education as derived from psychiatry gave central importance to identifying and strengthening the 'clear' to ensure successful democratization. This could either mean that the 'clear' had to be discovered among the debris of the Nazi régime in the German population, or it had to be created and nurtured through special programmes. In the event, American occupation policy included measures to accomplish both.

Three foci may be distinguished among efforts to 'find' the 'clear': (i) certain *persons* may be looked for who would be suitable for the particular tasks of democratization envisaged by military government; (ii) certain *elements* in the German may have democratic potential, albeit somewhat damaged by Nazism; (iii) certain *institutions* may be particularly suitable for developing the people's sense of what democracy entails.

in National Socialism, was dealt with in Parsons' *major opus* which appeared six years after World War II, *The Social System* (Glencoe, 1951), especially pp. 182–194. The change 'back' and 'forward' between ascription and achievement in Germany before and after WWII is discussed in *Social System*, pp. 523–525. A warning against the dangers of status-mindedness in ascription is implicit in his 'Democracy and Social Structure in Pre-Nazi Germany' (1942), in Gerhardt, *Parsons on National Socialism*, pp. 225–242.

⁸⁶ Parsons, 'Institutional Change' (1945), in Gerhardt, *Parsons on National Socialism*, p. 314.

As it happened, attempts were made on all three levels. For example, in his account of psychiatry's extension into educational, industrial, and political realms since the 1920s, *New Fields of Psychiatry* (1947), David Levy reported on the work of the Screening Center of the Information Control Division in the US zone, located in Bad Orb near Frankfurt. The democratic credentials of all applicants for political office and for newspaper and printing licences were checked. Using suitably adapted psychiatric investigative procedures, the Center hoped to find genuine anti-Nazis among the Germans who applied for or were proposed for key functions in the emerging mass media. These were then entrusted with responsibility while given ample support by the occupation authorities. Levy described the kind of personality they were attempting to exclude: 'The Nazi régime especially intensified those personality adjustments that help to make survival possible in a tyrannical state—obeisance, opportunism, constant purposive thinking at the expense of spontaneity and phantasy, resulting from the necessity of always watching your step, sizing up every individual you meet, allying yourself with people who count, ruthless separation from friends to the point of denunciation when they might in any way imperil your safety.'⁸⁷ The task was to detect genuine anti-Nazis, that is, persons who lacked these attitudes or coping strategies.⁸⁸

Finding individuals who could be entrusted with particular responsibilities because they had remained 'clear' from Nazism was the purpose of the 'White Lists'.⁸⁹ These lists of names of Germans suitable for public office or academic teaching were compiled from information received from emigrés, prisoners-of-war during their interrogation, businessmen who had contacts with German firms and other sources. Regarding the realm of education, for instance, the

⁸⁷ David M. Levy, *New Fields of Psychiatry* (New York, 1947), pp. 108–109.

⁸⁸ See also David M. Levy, 'Anti-Nazis. Criteria of Differentiation', *Psychiatry*, 11 (1948), 125–167.

⁸⁹ Ian Sayer and Douglas Botting, *The Secret Army: The Untold Story of the Counterintelligence Corps* (London, 1989), p. 203, mentions that 'White Lists' and also 'Black Lists' of enemy intelligence agents, paramilitary personnel, SS and Nazi Party members, renegade Allied nationals, and other counterintelligence subjects drawn up by MI5, MI6, MI9, MI14, OSS, PWE (Political Warfare Executive), and other sources were distributed to all CIC commanders. The main task of the CIC (Counter Intelligence Corps) was to search for and possibly arrest persons on the 'Black Lists'. A comprehensive account of the 'White List' policy has so far not been written. Portraits of some of the German personalities on the 'White List' as well as of those among the Military Government Officers with whom they collaborated in post-war Germany are given in Henric L. Wuermeling, *Die weisse Liste* (Berlin, 1981). Among the 'White List' German personalities sought out by American officers in Heidelberg were Theodor Heuss, who later became President of the Federal Republic of Germany, and Alfred Weber, the brother of Max Weber, who had withdrawn voluntarily from the University during the Nazi régime but now became a key figure in the revival of the University in 1945/46. See Uta Gerhardt, 'Heuss, Weber, and the Spirit of Re-education'. Paper presented to a Conference on 'The Spirit of Heidelberg and the Future of Germany 1945' (Heidelberg, 1993). 'White Lists' are mentioned in Zink, *American Military Government*, p. 92; their value in identifying individuals fit for office is seen as ambiguous in Padover, *Experiment in Germany* (1946), pp. 132–140. Contemporaneous accounts, it seems, underestimated their immense value as a first step towards the democratization of a defeated country in chaos.

Handbook for Military Government in Germany Prior to Defeat or Surrender (official version of December 1944), gave a definition of the 'White List' which was as follows: 'THE WHITE LIST. This will contain the names of persons inside Germany whose character, professional standing, experience, and political reliability render them especially suitable to be placed in positions of responsibility, and, in particular, to act: (a) As temporary educational administrators and/or advisers, pending the establishment of a regular administrative system; (b) As acting Rectors of Universities pending regular elections by the Senate; (c) As acting Heads of Teachers' Training Colleges.'⁹⁰ It was one of the tasks of the Psychological Warfare Division during the first days and weeks after fighting ceased to search for the persons on the 'White Lists' as they had often withdrawn or fled to remote places.⁹¹

Another focus was prisoner-of-war-camps, where volunteers were recruited for training in democratic leadership. A large number of German ex-military personnel were given courses in the rules and principles of democracy (Bill of Rights, division of powers, multi-party system, etc.) as compared with the Nazi dictatorship. They were also confronted with the truth about German crimes which they were expected not to deny.⁹² In camps situated in the US, the effect of such democratic education programmes was evaluated by a questionnaire applied by public-opinion staff. These surveys showed that of well over 300 000 POWs who had undergone re-education, 61 per cent changed from a neutral to a positive appreciation of democracy, 23 per cent were or became strongly anti-Nazi, and only a rump of 3 per cent proved 'Nazi diehards'.⁹³ One of the questions asked of these German ex-military personnel

⁹⁰ *Handbook*, Articles 816–822, esp. 822.

⁹¹ The PWD's relatively vaguely defined area of responsibility and determination to eradicate Nazism, and also its frequent change of affiliation under SHAEF and later OMGUS, are described in Marshall Knappen, *And Call It Peace* (Chicago, 1947). Daniel Lerner, *Psychological Warfare against Nazi Germany* (New York, 1949) only mentions in passing that after liberation but before VE-Day, PWD established its first contacts with potential *Bürgermeister*, etc. (which is reported by Padover, *Experiment*, who was on a PWD mission).

⁹² Regarding the training for democracy of German prisoners of war, see Curt Bondy, 'Observation and Reeducation of German Prisoners of War', *Harvard Educational Review* 14 (1944), 12–19; Henry W. Ehrmann, 'An Experiment in Political Education. The Prisoner-of-War Schools in the United States', *Social Research*, 14 (1947), 304–320; John H. Hildring, 'What Is Our Purpose In Germany?', *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 255 (1948), 77–89, esp. p. 80; Dan Stets, 'The Spirit of Kearney. Project in Rhode Island That Shaped Postwar Germany', *Providence Sunday Journal*, 18 July 1982, 6–12 (on the origin of 'Der Ruf' and 'Gruppe 47' in a prisoner-of-war camp project).

⁹³ 'Many German P.O.W.s Like Democracy', *The Christian Science Monitor*, 5 July 1946. The concluding comment is: 'The intelligence derived from these questionnaires is being used by the United States Military Government in Germany, giving as it does information on the attitudes and opinions of the prisoners, who have been repatriated. It also provides the Military Government with analyses of the political attitude of this important segment of the present German population.' The follow-up in Germany of former prisoners-of-war is reported in 'Ansichten der ehemaligen Fort-Getty Schueler', Special Report No. 93 A, ICD Opinion Surveys, OMGUS (Berlin, 22 Jan 1948). When asked what had surprised them most upon their return to Germany, 44 per cent complained about corruption and bureaucracy, and 42 per cent saw strong remainders of Nazism and militarism.

was: 'You have seen moving pictures and a booklet concerning concentration camps in Germany. Do you believe that such conditions did exist—or do you think it was just some false propaganda we dreamed up?' Answering this question, 36 per cent of the prisoners accepted the concentration camp films as true, 32 per cent considered them propaganda, and 32 per cent refused to express their opinion.⁹⁴ Similar efforts to bring home the truth of Nazi crimes as a prelude to democracy and co-operation with the Americans were also made at the Bad Orb centre of ICD.⁹⁵

An institutional sphere naturally included in re-education was politics. In particular, the full participation of the German population in future political parties and the imminent elections was a main aim of military government. Political parties, wrote former Military Government of Württemberg-Baden officer Moses Moskowitz in 1946, were to serve Germans as 'an incentive to participate actively in the establishment of democratic institutions and to regard them as their own'.⁹⁶ The milieu best suited for such a function was the local community. The 'clear' could most readily assert itself at that level for two reasons. First, Nazis would be known on a local level, and their exclusion from active and passive voting rights could be most effectively enforced where they were known. Secondly, wherever anti-Nazis had survived they would be found on the lowest level of political organization, namely, among rank and file Germans who had not been involved directly or indirectly in Nazi party activities. Again, they could be found more easily on a local level, and more often in rural areas. Elections were therefore organized on the principle that the highest (Land) level would come last (June, 1946). In this way, and after the democratic forces had succeeded at the rural and

⁹⁴ 'P.O.W.: What Germans think of U.S.', *The Christian Science Monitor*, 6 July 1946. Other questions were: 'Do you attribute the human treatment which you received in American prisoner of war camps to weakness on the part of Americans?'; 'Have you felt free to express anti-Nazi opinions without fear of mistreatment by your comrades?'; 'What is the most important single idea you have learned during your internment in America?' To the last question, 47 per cent had no answer; however, 34 per cent had answers emphasizing 'that democracy and freedom were good things to have'. One prisoner is reported to have said: 'Americans claim they developed the atom bomb. But they didn't drop the first one 'til after Germany's defeat. That means the invention was made by Germans and subsequently brought to America.'

⁹⁵ The Bad Orb facility housed a training school which put over 800 Germans through courses in government, democracy, etc., to enable them to work for the military government. Levy, *New Fields of Psychiatry*, pp. 105–106. On a wider scale, films (especially 'Todesmühlen') which had been made of the Nazi concentration camps on discovery were to bring home to Germans how atrocious were the crimes of Nazism. See Ulrich M. Bausch, *Die Kulturpolitik der US-amerikanischen Information Control Division in Württemberg-Baden von 1945 bis 1949* (Stuttgart, 1992), pp. 103–110.

⁹⁶ Moses Moskowitz, 'The Political Re-education of the Germans: The Emergence of Parties and Politics in Württemberg-Baden (May 1945–June 1946)', *Political Science Quarterly*, 61 (1946), 561. See also Sidney B. Fay, 'Self-Government', *Current History*, 11 (1946), 500–506; James K. Pollock, 'Foreign Government and Politics. The Role of the Public in a New Germany', *American Political Science Review*, 39 (1945), 464–473. For American historian Gimbel, the dilemma lay in securing democracy while re-establishing efficiency. See John Gimbel, *The American Occupation of Germany, 1945–1949* (Stanford, 1968).

regional levels, democracy would stand a better chance in cities and in the Land elections.⁹⁷ The same idea motivated the re-introduction of self-government for the smallest municipalities abolished by the Nazis. This was one of the first measures of the US military government because it gave weight to the local community as an observable arena of 'clear' forces.⁹⁸

As an example of an organization created to enhance 'clear' tendencies, the Army Youth Programme may be mentioned. It originated with a Sergeant Moriarity inviting German youths to play baseball with American soldiers, then developed into a club in Bremen 'to try to give them a chance in grim, postsurrender Germany'.⁹⁹ After becoming an official programme in November 1945, with volunteer soldiers, the clubs quickly organized over half

⁹⁷ Clay, in his memoirs, stressed the deliberate policy behind the 'bottom-first' sequence of elections as well as the importance of holding them as soon as possible after VE-Day. 'I was convinced that the soundest way to restore political government was from the ground up rather than from the top down, and that elections should be held progressively from the village to the state level', wrote Clay, and he reported that his advisers, even James Pollock, were less sure than Clay himself that Germans were prepared for democracy. 'The first elections were set in January 1946 to allow sufficient time for the States to issue electoral laws precluding former Nazis from becoming candidates and preventing active Nazis from voting. They were held in villages (Gemeinden) with fewer than 20 000 inhabitants. We took care to see that armed troops were not on duty in the election districts and asked occupation personnel to keep off the streets as much as possible. Final reports showed that 86 per cent of those eligible had voted, an extraordinarily high percentage for any local election and almost twice what we would expect at home. Thus we were able to give local government, which under the Nazis had little if any autonomy and since surrender necessarily had been dominated by military government, a base of popular support and understanding' (1950, p. 88).

⁹⁸ Friedrich, an adviser to Clay in 1946 and again in 1947–1948, explained that the idea was 'the building up of democratic support "from the grass roots"', while disregarding or suppressing the Communist 'Antifascist Fighting Association' ('Anti-fascist Movement') which had sprung up in various big cities (e.g., Bremen, Leipzig) (1948, p. 246). Writing in 1948, he went on to say that the statement of general principles issued as Directive to Commander-in-Chief of US Forces in Germany, Clay, on July 11, 1947, establishing the criteria of democratization and also of decentralization should ensure German resumption of authority under American control. 'As these constitutions become law', he predicted, 'American military government will be increasingly justified in adopting a policy of watchful vigilance, allowing the Germans to assume responsibility, but making sure that they stay within the general objectives of Allied policy' (1948, p. 206; see also pp. 403f. for the text of the 'United States' Political Objectives in Germany' as well as that regarding 'German Self-Government' in the Chiefs' of Staff Directive of July 11, 1947).

⁹⁹ Clay, *Decision*, 64. Zink, in his account published in 1947, gives the following rationale for the programme: 'Accustomed to the multifarious and frequently sensational activities of the Nazi youth groups, the young Germans perhaps found the Allied occupation more dreary than even the older ones. Recognizing this, the American occupying authorities enlisted the aid of the military forces throughout Germany. American youth in uniform have been encouraged to organize athletic events, discussion groups and other activities which would include German young people. Out of the association between the Americans and the Germans it is hoped that a certain basic impact can be made on German psychology and standards of conduct' (1947, p. 163). For an interpretation of youth policy as a positive measure designed to supplement the policy of denazification and the more educative efforts of control of the Germans in their relations to expellees and Jews, see Uta Gerhardt, 'Re-Demokratisierung nach 1945 im Spiegel der zeitgenössischen Sozialforschung und sozialwissenschaftlichen Literatur', in Uta Gerhardt and Ekkehard Mochmann (eds), *Gesellschaftlicher Umbruch 1945–1990: Lebensverhältnisse und Re-Demokratisierung* (Munich, 1992), pp. 27–57, esp. pp. 46–52.

a million young Germans on a strictly voluntary basis. All the military government provided was a heated room where the youths could meet, and usually some food.¹⁰⁰ Youth activities were readily sponsored by the military government, and the Military Governor's report noted in June 1947 that over one million German youths had joined voluntary groups organized by the churches, trade unions, or sports clubs, etc.¹⁰¹ The aim of this initiative was to strengthen the 'clear' orientations in young Germans.

Conclusion

To conclude, I should like to sum up my argument. The various facets of military government policy mentioned are only examples. They do not exhaust the broad scope of measures introduced under the umbrella of re-education and with a perspective of finding or creating 'clear' elements in German lives and minds. However, these examples may suffice to show that the psychiatrically based idea of searching for 'clear' aspects and developing them into dominant features of a personality or nation was indeed used in American re-education policy. It remains for another article to show in detail the various ways in which this idea was used after World War II. My main aim has been to explore the background of some occupation policies for the contribution made by psychiatry and psychology to the United States' preparation for the re-education of Germany during World War II.

¹⁰⁰ The directive signed by Military Governor McNarney in November 1945, establishing the Army Youth Programme, stated as its general rationale that the issue was to motivate potential political leaders for the German future, by offering recreational programmes making democracy more acceptable. The text read: 'After defeat German youth today is disillusioned, frustrated and confused lacking an acceptable objective in life. These potential leaders of tomorrow's Germany cannot build on a democratic foundation without receiving from us such positive assistance as they themselves desire and voluntarily accept.' Memorandum Headquarters US Forces European Theater. Subject: Theater Special Services Handicraft Programme for Assistance to German Youth Activities. The memorandum cites Theater Directive AG 3500 OPSS—dated 10 June 1945, Subject 'Theater Handicraft Programme', as the earliest document for the Army German Youth Programme. (OMGUS files, RG 260-1945/46—folder 84/3 AG). The GYA addressed itself to children and youth ranging from the age of eight to fourteen or sixteen years. Clay estimated that its membership was some 600 000 young Germans (1950, p. 64). As a parallel policy, German youth associations such as sports clubs, church youth groups, etc. were encouraged.

¹⁰¹ The Military Governor's Monthly Reports which appeared from August 1945 onwards included regular documentation of youth activities and their spread. For instance, the Monthly Report No. 25 for 1-31 July 1947 reported on the topic that German youth delegates had participated in international meetings, an international youth conference had been held in Frankfurt, camping programmes and hiking trips had been organized, US constabulary units were teaching US games to German schoolchildren and helped them with their sports programme, and so on. The report contained statistics showing that membership in youth groups, organized around religion, sports, handicraft, culture, trade unions or other ('miscellaneous') objectives, amounted to 477 734 members in July 1946, and 956 565 in July 1947, involving nearly 10 per cent of the 6-18-year olds in 1946, rising to over 15 per cent in 1947. 'Monthly Report of the Military Governor. Office of Military Government for Germany (U.S.)' 1-31 July 1947, No. 25, pp. 33, 96.